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I investigate the extent to which the description of quantum systems by Gibbs states can be
justified purely on the basis of tomographic data, without recourse to theoretical concepts such as
infinite ensembles, environments, information, or to the systems’ dynamics. I show that the use of
Gibbs states amounts to a relevance hypothesis, which I spell out in detail. This hypothesis can be
subjected to statistical hypothesis testing and hence assessed on the basis of the experimental data.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To describe the static or dynamic properties of a
macroscopic quantum system, typically only a few ob-
servables {Ga} are deemed relevant – for example, the
system’s constants of the motion (if static), slow observ-
ables (if dynamic), or observables pertaining to some sub-
system of interest. In statistical mechanics the system is
then assigned that quantum state which, while reproduc-
ing the observed values {ga} of the relevant observables,
maximizes the von Neumann entropy
S[µ] := −tr(µ lnµ); (1)
i.e., its state – which I shall denote by µg – is determined
by the maximization
µg := arg max
µ∈g S[µ], (2)
where µ ∈ g is short for the constraints 〈Ga〉µ = ga∀a. It
has the Gibbs form
µg ∝ exp(−λaGa) (3)
with Lagrange parameters {λa} and a constant of pro-
portionality (the inverse of the partition function) chosen
to ensure state normalization, trµg = 1. For ease of nota-
tion I adopted here the Einstein convention that identical
upper and lower indices are to be summed over. In the
special case that only the system’s energy is relevant,
the set {Ga} contains just the Hamiltonian, and the as-
sociated Lagrange parameter is the inverse temperature;
the Gibbs state is then a canonical state. While they first
arose in the context of statistical mechanics, Gibbs states
nowadays play an important role also on smaller scales.
For instance, they have been employed successfully in
nanoscale thermodynamics [1–3], high energy physics [4],
or incomplete quantum-state tomography [5–11].
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Why entropy maximization, and hence the use of the
Gibbs form, should be the proper paradigm for construct-
ing the quantum state has been the subject of much
debate. The classic textbook argument in statistical
mechanics relies on an idealization, the thermodynamic
limit: The system of interest is viewed as but one mem-
ber of a fictitious infinite ensemble of identically prepared
systems. If the global state of this fictitious ensemble
is constrained by sharp values (not expectation values)
for the totals of the relevant observables then the re-
duced state of any single member of the ensemble has
the Gibbs form [12]. Recent research suggests that one
can do without such fictitious ensembles and derive the
Gibbs form just as well directly from a few generic as-
sumptions, as long as the state in question pertains to
a subsystem coupled to a sufficiently large environment
[13, 14]. Another popular argument invokes the intimate
connection between entropy and information: By maxi-
mizing entropy, Gibbs states discard to a maximal extent
all information (and thus retain no spurious bias) as to
irrelevant degrees of freedom; so they carry information
solely about the relevant ones. This insight is at the
heart of the information-theoretic approach to statistical
mechanics [15–18]. Yet another line of reasoning, going
back to Boltzmann’s H theorem [19], brings into play the
system’s effective dynamics on some coarse-grained level
of description, in particular its tendency to increase en-
tropy [20–23]. Such arguments rely on the existence of
disparate time scales in the system [24]. Finally, some
authors in both the statistics [25, 26] and physics [27]
communities have argued (for the classical case only) that
the maximum entropy paradigm is mandated by logical
consistency; but this point of view remains controversial
[28, 29].
In the present paper I wish to add a different perspec-
tive. State construction via maximum entropy is a special
instance of a much broader task: estimating a quantum
state on the basis of imperfect data. Experimental data
are in fact never perfect, not even for simple systems,
because the investigated samples have finite size, mea-
surement devices have limited accuracy, and possibly –
as is the case in statistical mechanics – the observables
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2measured are not informationally complete. So in prac-
tice, data never specify a unique quantum state. Rather,
among the many states compatible with the data one
must infer the most probable one, using suitable statisti-
cal estimation techniques. Such techniques have become
an indispensable tool for data analysis in modern quan-
tum physics experiments and go by the name of quantum-
state tomography [30, 31].
If the maximum entropy paradigm may be thus sub-
sumed under the broader framework of quantum-state
tomography then perhaps the latter can shed some light
on the question as to when and how Gibbs states arise.
Exploring the extent to which this is indeed possible, is
the purpose of the present paper. Consequently, I shall
tackle the issue of Gibbs states solely with the help of
statistical methods from quantum-state tomography and
nothing else; in particular, without any recourse to the
thermodynamic limit, environments, the concept of in-
formation, or dynamics.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as
follows. In Sec. II, I will review some basic concepts
of quantum-state tomography. In Sec. III, I will focus
on the situation where the experimental data come in the
form of sample means of some informationally incomplete
set of observables. I will show that in this case one can
apply the quantum Sanov theorem to find the asymp-
totics of the pertinent likelihood function. The subse-
quent Sec. IV is then crucial for the understanding of
Gibbs states: I will argue that the use of the Gibbs form
is tantamount to a statistical “relevance hypothesis”, for
which I shall give a precise mathematical formulation.
In Sec. V, I will discuss how the likelihood of this hy-
pothesis and of possible rival hypotheses may be assessed
in the light of experimental data. Finally, in Sec. VI, I
shall conclude with a brief summary and a few additional
remarks.
II. QUANTUM-STATE TOMOGRAPHY
It is possible to know the precise state of an individual
quantum system after a measurement: For instance, if
measurement of some observable returns one of its non-
degenerate eigenvalues then after the measurement, the
system is known with certainty to be in the associated
eigenstate. (Precise knowledge of the post-measurement
state hinges thus on precise knowledge of the measured
observable. Strictly speaking, the latter presupposes ad-
ditional preceding measurements.) Yet it is impossible
to reconstruct, based on measurements on the individual
system alone, its state before the measurement [32]. Such
a reconstruction requires instead measurements on many
identically prepared copies; and even then, as the number
of copies is always finite (let alone the limited accuracy
of measurement devices), can never be perfect. Thus
in practice, measurement never yields a unique quan-
tum state. Indeed, current experiments that implement
quantum circuits or probe fundamental aspects of quan-
FIG. 1. Exchangeable sequence of quantum systems. One
obtains a finite exchangeable sequence of L quantum systems
by drawing randomly L systems from a fictitious infinite sym-
metric sequence.
tum information in many-body systems work with typical
sample sizes of several hundreds or thousands, leading to
statistical errors of up to 10% [33]. Under these circum-
stances one can only aspire to identify among the many
states compatible with the data the most probable one.
This requires the use of suitable statistical estimation
techniques and is the subject of quantum-state tomogra-
phy [30, 31].
Identical preparation of copies means that these form
an exchangeable sequence [34]. Such a sequence has finite
length L, which may be chosen freely. It can be thought
of as drawn randomly from a fictitious infinite sequence
of systems whose order is irrelevant (Fig. 1). Exchange-
ability entails two basic properties for the L-body state
ρ(L) of the sequence: (i) it is symmetric under permuta-
tion of the constituents; and (ii) since the exchangeable
sequence of length L can always be considered a sub-
sequence of a longer, equally exchangeable sequence of
length L+ 1, the state ρ(L) can be written as a marginal
of ρ(L+1).
Exchangeability is more than mere symmetry. For ex-
ample, the 2-body density matrix ρAB = |ψAB〉〈ψAB | as-
sociated with the Bell state |ψAB〉 = (1/
√
2)(|00〉+ |11〉)
is invariant under permutation of the constituents and
hence meets the symmetry criterion; yet it cannot be
written as the marginal of an equally symmetric 3-body
state and thus fails to meet the second criterion for ex-
changeability. Exchangeable is also not the same as in-
dependent and identically distributed (i.i.d.): in general,
it is ρ(L) 6= ρ⊗L. Rather, by a quantum generalization
[34] of the classical de Finetti theorem [35], the state of
an exchangeable sequence can always be represented as
an incoherent mixture of i.i.d. sequences ρ⊗L,
ρ(L) =
∫
dρ prob(ρ) ρ⊗L, (4)
with respective weights prob(ρ), where the integral is
over all normalized single-particle states. Conversely,
any state of this form describes an exchangeable se-
quence. The de Finetti representation shows that an
exchangeable sequence may well exhibit classical correla-
tions. However, it never exhibits entanglement.
Exchangeable sequences are the “raw material” of
quantum-state tomography. The uncertainty about the
state of an individual constituent is reflected in the den-
sity function prob(ρ); the latter may be considered (in
3somewhat loose terminology [34]) the probability distri-
bution for the unknown single-constituent state. To learn
more about this state, a sample of size N (N < L) is
taken from the exchangeable sequence and a measure-
ment performed on it, yielding data D. Afterwards the
remaining L − N systems (i.e., the original sequence
minus the sample) still form an exchangeable sequence
whose state has the above de Finetti representation; yet
the probability distribution featuring in this de Finetti
representation must be updated according to a quantum
generalization of Bayes’ rule [36],
prob(ρ|D) ∝ prob(D|ρ⊗N ) prob(ρ), (5)
where the probabilities denote (from left to right) the
posterior, likelihood function, and prior, respectively,
and the constant of proportionality is independent of ρ.
This Bayesian update encapsulates the process of learn-
ing from sample data (Fig. 2).
Upon investigation of additional samples, Bayes’ rule
is iterated, leading to consecutive updates of the poste-
rior. As more and more data accumulate – by investigat-
ing more samples or increasing their sizes – the posterior
narrows until eventually its width falls below some de-
sired error bound. Then within this error, the location
of the posterior peak is the best estimate for the un-
known quantum state. In the hypothetical limit of infi-
nite sample size, informationally complete measurements
and perfectly accurate measurement devices the posterior
converges towards the likelihood function, which in turn
approaches a delta function. The state estimate is then
determined – to perfect accuracy – by experimental data
only and becomes independent of the prior. (It is the fact
that this is possible, at least in principle, which gives op-
erational meaning to the notion of “state”.) Against this
backdrop many state estimation techniques focus from
the outset on the likelihood function, equating the loca-
tion of its peak with the most plausible state estimate;
such techniques fall into the class of maximum likelihood
methods [37–39]. In contrast, methods that take into ac-
count the residual influence of the prior (which in prac-
tice is always present and for small samples may be quite
significant) are termed Bayesian [40–42].
Strictly speaking, even in the above hypothetical limit
the posterior coincides with the likelihood function only if
the prior has support on the entire state space. The prior
reflects any theoretical constraint or bias that one may
have, prior to measurement, as to the parametric form
or parameter values of the quantum state. As long as
one knows nothing or little about the state a priori, this
prior is broad and indeed has full support. But as soon as
one has advance knowledge that constrains the quantum
state to some finite region or proper submanifold of state
space, the prior has support on this region or submanifold
only; and so will the posterior, regardless of the data [43].
In Sec. IV, I shall argue that such a priori restrictions
play an important role in the understanding of Gibbs
states.
FIG. 2. Learning from sample data. (1) Before the experi-
ment an exchangeable sequence is characterized by some prior
probability distribution prob(ρ) in single-constituent state
space. If, say, on theoretical grounds one expects the members
of the sequence to be in a state close to σ then this prior will
be peaked around σ. It has a finite width reflecting the finite
degree of confidence in this prior bias. (2) Investigation of a
sample yields data D. Associated with these data is a like-
lihood function prob(D|ρ⊗N ), typically peaked around some
other state which might be close to, but is usually not equal
to σ. The likelihood function, too, has a finite width, reflect-
ing the finite size N of the sample (and possibly other sources
of error). (3) According to Bayes’ rule, multiplying the prior
with the likelihood function yields the posterior prob(ρ|D).
The latter is typically narrower than the prior, reflecting the
growing confidence in the state estimate as experimental data
accumulate. The center of the posterior has shifted from the
original bias σ to a new state interpolating between σ and the
center of the likelihood function.
III. SANOV LIKELIHOOD
I suppose that the experimental data consist in a set
of sample means {fb} gleaned from a sample of large but
finite size N . These sample means may have been ob-
tained directly by measurement of the pertinent observ-
ables {Fb}, or inferred indirectly from other data D — a
possibility which is particularly relevant when the sam-
ple means pertain to observables that do not commute.
In the latter case I shall say that the observed data D
“encompass” sample means {fb} if and only if the set of
states compatible with the data,
Γ(D) :=
{
µ
∣∣prob(D|µ⊗N ) ≥ 1− } (6)
(up to some finite error parameter , 0 <  < 1, which
is independent of sample size), contains the set of states
yielding expectation values 〈Fb〉µ = fb∀b; in short, f ⊆
Γ(D). When the set Γ(D) is large, the data might
encompass not just {fb} but also different values {f ′b}
4FIG. 3. Relating data to sample means. The set Γ(D) con-
tains all states compatible (up to some error ) with observed
data D (shaded area). In order to encompass sample means
{fb} this set must contain all states yielding 〈Fb〉 = fb∀b (solid
line). In the above example, Γ(D) is so large that it also en-
compasses other values {f ′b} for the sample means (dashed
line).
for the sample means (Fig. 3). On the other hand, if
the set Γ(D) contains only f but no other f
′, and is
moreover the smallest set to do so, then I shall say that
the data amount to having measured the sample means
f . With this understanding, the likelihood of measuring
sample means f reads
prob({fb}|ρ⊗N ) := inf
D
{
prob(D|ρ⊗N )∣∣ f ⊆ Γ(D)} .
(7)
Defined in the above way, the likelihood generally de-
pends on the error parameter . For large sample sizes
N , however, the infimum on the right-hand side behaves
asymptotically as
inf
D
{. . .} ∼ exp
[
−N min
µ∈f
S(µ‖ρ)
]
(8)
and hence loses its dependence on ; this follows from
the quantum generalization [44–46] of the classical Sanov
theorem [47–49]. Here
S(µ‖ρ) :=
{
tr(µ lnµ− µ ln ρ) : supp µ ⊆ supp ρ
+∞ : otherwise (9)
denotes the relative entropy of the two states µ and ρ [50–
53]. In other words, for large N the likelihood function
behaves as
prob({fb}|ρ⊗N ) ∼ exp[−NS(µρf‖ρ)] (10)
with
µρf := arg min
µ∈f
S(µ‖ρ), (11)
independently of . Due to its close connection to the
quantum Sanov theorem, I shall call this asymptotic like-
lihood the Sanov likelihood. The state µρf which, under
given constraints on the expectation values {〈Fb〉}, mini-
mizes the relative entropy with respect to the “reference
state” ρ has the generalized Gibbs form [54]
µρf ∝ exp[(ln ρ− 〈ln ρ〉ρ)− κbFb] (12)
with Lagrange parameters {κb} and the constant of pro-
portionality again chosen to ensure trµρf = 1.
There is the special case where the sample means {fb}
are informationally complete. In this case the data deter-
mine a unique tomographic image (i.e., center of the like-
lihood function) µ, the sole state to yield 〈Fb〉µ = fb∀b.
The quantum Sanov theorem then reduces to the quan-
tum Stein lemma [55–57], and the asymptotic likelihood
function becomes
prob(µ|ρ⊗N ) ∼ exp[−NS(µ‖ρ)]. (13)
I call this the Stein likelihood. Thanks to a mixing rule
for the relative entropy [58], the Stein likelihood satisfies
prob(µ|ρ⊗N ) · prob(µ′|ρ⊗N ′) ∝
prob( NN+N ′µ+
N ′
N+N ′µ
′|ρ⊗(N+N ′)) (14)
with a constant of proportionality that does not depend
on the state ρ. So for the purposes of Bayesian updat-
ing via Eq. (5), obtaining first a tomographic image µ
from a sample of size N and subsequently a tomographic
image µ′ from another sample of size N ′ is tantamount
to obtaining the weighted average of µ and µ′ from the
combined sample of size N +N ′; sequential or joint pro-
cessing of the data both yield the same posterior. In
other words, in the asymptotic limit considered here it
does not matter how the system copies under investiga-
tion are grouped into samples.
IV. RELEVANCE HYPOTHESIS
The statement: “The observables {Ga} are relevant”
entails two distinct assertions: (i) The expectation val-
ues of the {Ga} completely determine the state estimate
(and all predictions following from it); and (ii) any up-
date of this state estimate is determined by additional
data pertaining to the {Ga} only, and not by any other
data. (This notion of “relevance” is similar to the notion
of “consistency” invoked – in the classical case and for
one special set of observables only – in Ref. [27].) In
this section, I shall prove that the relevance hypothesis
imposes on the state estimate the Gibbs form (3).
The first assertion implies that there must exist an al-
gorithm {ga} 7→ ρ assigning to any set of expectation
values {ga} ≡ {〈Ga〉} a unique state ρ. This algorithm
need not necessarily be the maximum entropy algorithm.
More generally, when the expectation values {ga} are
not known exactly but only their probability distribution
5prob(g) then there must exist an algorithm assigning to
this probability distribution a unique probability distri-
bution of states, prob(g) 7→ prob(ρ).
I will now show that the second, logically independent
assertion singles out the maximum entropy algorithm,
and hence the Gibbs form (3). In my proof I will invoke
various states and sets of states which are illustrated in
Fig. IV. Let a tomographic measurement on a sample
of large but finite size N come in two versions, one in-
formationally complete and the other informationally in-
complete. Whereas the complete version returns a unique
tomographic image µ, the incomplete version merely re-
turns sample means {ga} for the observables {Ga}. The
latter are consistent with the former, ga = 〈Ga〉µ. If in-
deed the observables {Ga} are the relevant ones then by
the second assertion, it must not make a difference which
of the two data sets, complete or incomplete, is processed
in the Bayesian update (5). Both must yield the same
posterior, and so it must hold that
prob(µ|ρ⊗N ) prob(ρ) ∝ prob({ga}|ρ⊗N ) prob(ρ) (15)
with a constant of proportionality that does not de-
pend on ρ. This requirement can only be met if ei-
ther the prior prob(ρ) vanishes or else, by Eqs. (10)
(with f = g) and (13), the difference of relative entropies
[S(µ‖ρ) − S(µρg‖ρ)] is independent of ρ. By the law of
Pythagoras for the relative entropy [59], this difference is
itself a relative entropy,
S(µ‖µρg) = S(µ‖ρ)− S(µρg‖ρ). (16)
It ought to have the same value for all ρ that have a non-
vanishing prior probability. Let σ be one specific such
state with non-vanishing prior probability. Then for all
other ρ, it must hold that
S(µ‖µρg) = S(µ‖µσg ) ∀µ, ρ : prob(ρ) 6= 0. (17)
In the special case µ = ρ it is ga = 〈Ga〉ρ =: ga(ρ) and
hence also µρg = ρ, so the left-hand side vanishes. Then
so must the right-hand side, and therefore
ρ = µσg(ρ) ∀ ρ : prob(ρ) 6= 0. (18)
Regardless of the experimental data, the admissible
states (prob(ρ) 6= 0) are restricted a priori to Gibbs
states of the generalized form (12), with reference state
σ and {Fb} = {Ga}.
The reference state σ may be any state that has a
non-vanishing prior probability. Among the states with
non-vanishing prior probability there is usually (albeit
not necessarily always) the totally mixed state. If so,
it will be most convenient to choose σ to be the to-
tally mixed state. With the totally mixed state as the
reference state, minimizing the relative entropy becomes
equivalent to maximizing the ordinary von Neumann en-
tropy; and then the generalized Gibbs form (12) reduces
to the ordinary Gibbs form (3), Q.E.D.
FIG. 4. States (dots) and sets of states (lines) featuring in
the discussion of the relevance hypothesis. A tomographic
measurement on a large but finite sample comes in two ver-
sions, one complete and the other incomplete. The complete
version returns a unique tomographic image µ; whereas the
incomplete version merely returns sample means g for the in-
formationally incomplete set of observables {Ga}. The state
µ is one out of the many states yielding 〈Ga〉 = ga (left black
line). An arbitrary state ρ yields expectation values g(ρ), as
do all other states that lie on the right black line. States
which minimize the relative entropy with respect to ρ, while
satisfying given constraints on the expectation values {〈Ga〉},
form a proper submanifold of state space (upper grey line);
for 〈Ga〉 = ga, the pertinent state is µρg. According to Bayes’
rule, the posterior state estimate depends not only on the data
but also on the prior. In particular, any estimate must be
among the states with a non-vanishing prior probability (dot-
ted line). Let the latter include some specific state σ. States
which minimize the relative entropy with respect to this σ,
while satisfying constraints on the {〈Ga〉}, form another sub-
manifold (lower grey line); for 〈Ga〉 = ga and 〈Ga〉 = ga(ρ)
the pertinent states are µσg and µ
σ
g(ρ), respectively. If the rel-
evance hypothesis holds then this last submanifold contains
all states with non-vanishing prior probability; so the lower
grey line in fact covers the dotted line.
The relevance hypothesis has significant implications
for quantum-state tomography. It affects both the lo-
cation (in state space) and the accuracy of the posterior
state estimate: Given the same data, different choices for
the set of relevant observables generally lead to different
state estimates with different degrees of confidence. This
can be illustrated with the simple example of state to-
mography on an exchangeable sequence of qubits. The
state space of a single qubit is the Bloch sphere, with the
totally mixed state at its origin. Let an incomplete to-
mographic measurement probe the Pauli spin component
X, yielding sample mean x¯. Associated with this data
is a likelihood function on the Bloch sphere. It is broad
on the two-dimensional plane containing states that yield
6FIG. 5. Two-dimensional section (z = 0) of the Bloch sphere.
The dashed line at x = x¯ indicates states yielding 〈X〉 = x¯,
the observed sample mean. The shaded areas indicate loca-
tion and width of the posterior when the relevant observables
comprise (1) all observables; (2) only X; or (3) only Y . In
the first two cases the resultant state estimate (center of the
posterior) lies somewhere between initial bias (totally mixed
state) and data, the precise location depending on the size of
the sample. The two cases differ in the degree of confidence
as to the unmeasured observable Y . In the third case the pos-
terior equals the prior because the data carry no information
about the then relevant observable Y .
〈X〉 = x¯ and narrowly peaked in the direction perpen-
dicular to this plane, the latter width decreasing with
increasing sample size. Considering solely this likelihood
function would lead to a maximum-likelihood state esti-
mate equal or close to ρml = (1 + x¯X)/2. However, as I
discussed in Sec. II, one must take into account also the
prior; and in particular, whether the prior has support
on the entire Bloch sphere or on some subspace only.
For the present example I shall consider three cases:
(i) all observables are relevant in the sense defined above;
(ii) only X is relevant (say, because the physical qubit is
a spin in a ferromagnet which is strongly anisotropic in
the x direction); or (iii) only Y is relevant. Whereas in
the first case the prior has support on the entire Bloch
sphere, in the other two cases it has support only on the x
or y axis, respectively. On the respective support, in the
absence of further information, the prior is some broad
symmetric distribution around the origin of the Bloch
sphere. Multiplying the respective priors with the like-
lihood function yields the respective posteriors. These
posteriors vary strongly from case to case; they are de-
picted schematically in Fig. 5.
V. MODEL SELECTION
In the preceding section I have shown how the rele-
vance hypothesis constrains state estimates a priori to
the Gibbs form (3), and how this affects quantum-state
estimation. One may wonder what in turn justifies the
relevance hypothesis, and to which set of observables it
should apply.
First of all, it is important to note that the relevant
observables do not necessarily coincide with the observ-
ables which are being measured in an experiment; an
observable is not relevant simply because one happens to
measure it. In the example considered above the observ-
able X was measured. And if the physical qubit was a
spin in a strongly anisotropic ferromagnet with preferred
direction along the x axis then indeed, the observable
X would also be the relevant one. But if the preferred
direction of the ferromagnet was along the y axis, the
relevant observable would be Y rather than X — even
though X was measured. Rather than the experimental
setup, the relevance hypothesis reflects prior knowledge
about the physics of the system. As is familiar from sta-
tistical mechanics, the choice of relevant observables is
usually linked to time scales: If the system is in equilib-
rium then the relevant observables comprise the system’s
constants of the motion; or else, provided the system’s
degrees of freedom evolve on two or more disparate time
scales, the slow observables [24].
The above warning notwithstanding, identifying mea-
sured with relevant observables is precisely what is being
done – implicitly – in maximum-entropy quantum state
estimation [5–11]. This shortcut (which is usually not
spelt out as such) actually often works because for an
observable to be measurable in practice, it must vary
slowly; and as long as the system exhibits a clear hierar-
chy of time scales, “slow” means indeed “relevant”.
Yet when one investigates a hitherto unknown sub-
stance, a hierarchy of time scales or other clues as to
the relevant observables are not available a priori; nor is
there any assurance that the shortcut “measured = rele-
vant” is warranted. In such a situation one can only for-
mulate conjectures as to the set of relevant observables.
The relevance hypothesis then becomes truly a hypothesis
in the statistical sense, subject to experimental scrutiny
and possibly refutation. There might be several compet-
ing hypotheses, perhaps even including the hypothesis
that the system cannot be described by Gibbs states at
all — that is, unless the set of relevant observables is
extended to become informationally complete, in which
case all observables would be relevant. Every proposal as
to the set of relevant observables constitutes a statistical
model, in the sense that state estimates are constrained
to a certain parametric form (Gibbs form) with a certain
number of adjustable parameters (Lagrange parameters).
Choosing among rival proposals in the light of the experi-
mental data then becomes an instance of statistical model
selection. It is this scenario on which I shall focus in the
present section.
7First, some general remarks about statistical model se-
lection may be in order. In general, rival statistical mod-
els for the same experimental data differ in the number
and type of adjustable parameters. On the one hand,
a model ought to be in good agreement with the data,
which is best achieved with a large number of adjustable
parameters; yet on the other hand, excessive complex-
ity must be avoided (“Occam’s razor”). The purpose
of model selection is to render this trade-off quantita-
tive. How this works in practice can be illustrated with
a simple textbook example [60, 61]. Let A be a sim-
ple model without adjustable parameter and B a more
complex model with one adjustable parameter λ. Which
model is to be preferred on the basis of data D will be
determined by the ratio of their respective posterior prob-
abilities. Due to Bayes’ rule, this ratio is given by
prob(A|D)
prob(B|D) =
prob(D|A)
prob(D|B)
prob(A)
prob(B)
. (19)
As long as one does not have any strong a priori pref-
erence for either of the models the right-hand side will
be dominated by the first factor, the ratio of likelihoods.
By the law of total probability, the likelihood function of
model B reads
prob(D|B) =
∫
dλ prob(D|λ,B) prob(λ|B). (20)
Let λ0 be that value of the adjustable parameter which
yields the best fit with the experimental data. Then the
first factor in the integral, considered as a function of λ,
will be peaked around a maximum at λ0; a typical shape
is a Gaussian
prob(D|λ,B) = prob(D|λ0, B) exp
[
− (λ− λ0)
2
2(δλ)2
]
(21)
of some width δλ. This width indicates the accuracy
to which the parameter λ is known after processing the
experimental data. In contrast, the second factor in the
integral describes the distribution of λ prior to processing
the data; this a priori distribution has a larger width
∆λ > δλ. Provided the best fit λ0 lies within the a
priori expected range, the ratio of likelihoods will scale
as
prob(D|A)
prob(D|B) ∼
prob(D|A)
prob(D|λ0, B)
∆λ
δλ
. (22)
The first ratio on the right-hand side is typically smaller
than one, favoring the more complex model B because
thanks to its adjustable parameter, B can achieve a
better fit with the data. In contrast, the second ratio
(∆λ/δλ) is larger than one, favoring the simpler model
A; this is the quantitative manifestation of Occam’s ra-
zor. It is thus the relative size of these two ratios which
will tip the balance in favor of one specific model.
The same logic applies to the identification of the most
plausible set of relevant observables on the basis of exper-
imental data. Details of the pertinent statistical analysis
have been spelt out by the author (in a different context)
in previous publications for two basic scenarios. In the
first scenario [42], different hypotheses as to the set of
relevant observables are formulated prior to experiment,
and subsequently the experiment is performed on a single
sample only. In the second scenario [58], which resem-
bles more closely the way an unknown substance is in-
vestigated in practice, measurements are performed first,
before formulating any hypotheses. Moreover, measure-
ments are performed not just on a single sample but on
multiple samples of the same unknown substance. These
samples need not – in fact, ought not – be in the same
state. Yet it is hypothesized that for all these samples
the same set of observables is relevant. Their respective
states should therefore all lie in the same submanifold of
Gibbs states, possibly with varying values for the associ-
ated Lagrange parameters.
For instance, the samples might all have been brought
into contact with heat baths at different temperatures.
Then one hypothesis might say that they are now all in
canonical states, the Hamiltonian (identical for all sam-
ples) being the sole relevant observable, with only the
temperature varying across samples. Another hypothesis
might say that beyond the Hamiltonian there are further
constants of the motion (again identical for all samples)
which need to be added to the set of relevant observables,
increasing the number of adjustable Lagrange parame-
ters. And a third, extreme hypothesis might claim that
the samples have not thermalized fully, and that hence
a Gibbs form is not justified and all observables remain
relevant. As in the textbook example above, increasing
thus the number of adjustable parameters will lead to a
successively better fit with the experimental data, yet at
the expense of simplicity. Again, goodness-of-fit has to
be traded off against simplicity in a quantitative fash-
ion. The optimal trade-off yields the most plausible set
of relevant observables.
Here I briefly summarize the key findings of the quan-
titative analysis; details have been reported in Ref. [58].
Various differently prepared samples are subjected to the
same tomography which, if not complete, must encom-
pass at least all candidates for relevancy. Let the i-th
sample have large but finite size Ni, and let tomography
on this sample render the tomographic image µ(i). (In
case the tomography is not complete, the image µ(i) is
constructed via ordinary maximum-entropy state estima-
tion.) Assuming that the finite sample size is the princi-
pal source of noise, error bars on the measurements are
of the order 1/
√
Ni. As before, let σ be a reference state
(usually the totally mixed state) with non-vanishing prior
probability, and let G denote the hypothesis that for all
samples the p observables {Ga}pa=1 are the relevant ones
in the sense defined above. Given this hypothesis, states
are constrained a priori to Gibbs states of the general-
ized form µσg . For a tomographic image µ
(i) the closest
such state is the state pi(i) := µσ
g(i)
, where g
(i)
a := 〈Ga〉µ(i)
(Fig. 6). In terms of these variables, and under certain
reasonable additional assumptions spelt out in Ref. [58],
8the log-likelihood of the hypothesis G behaves asymptot-
ically as
ln prob(D|G) ∼ −
∑
i
NiS(µ
(i)‖pi(i))− p
2
∑
i
lnNi (23)
modulo additive constants that do not depend on the
choice of relevant observables. Here D is short for the to-
tality of experimental data. As long as there is no strong
a priori preference for a specific set of relevant observ-
ables, the difference of log-likelihoods of rival hypotheses
dominates their relative posterior probabilities.
The above formula for the log-likelihood reflects in
a quantitative fashion the expected trade-off between
goodness-of-fit and simplicity. On the right-hand side
there are two contributions, both with a negative sign
and thus “penalizing” – in terms of likelihood – the hy-
pothesis G. The first contribution penalizes a bad fit
to the data: The further the Gibbs states pi(i) are away
from the original tomographic images µ(i), the larger the
relative entropies S(µ(i)‖pi(i)), and hence the larger the
penalty. To avoid this penalty, the set of relevant observ-
ables should be chosen sufficiently large. In contrast, the
second contribution embodies Occam’s razor, penalizing
excessive complexity: The larger the number p of relevant
observables, the larger the penalty. In order to avoid the
latter penalty, the set of relevant observables should be
kept as small as possible. So in line with our general
considerations, one must trade off these two penalties in
order to find the most likely set of relevant observables.
In sum, in the absence of any prior knowledge about
time scales or other clues as to the set of relevant observ-
ables, the most likely set can be determined via the above
statistical analysis. The use of the associated Gibbs form
is then corroborated by the tomographic data only.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding sections I explored the extent to which
the use of Gibbs states can be understood with the
help of methods from quantum-state tomography. These
methods apply to systems that are finite and isolated;
hence they require neither the limit N → ∞ nor aux-
iliary concepts such as infinite ensembles or large envi-
ronments. (However, I did assume that sample sizes are
large enough to justify the use of the asymptotic Sanov
likelihood to good accuracy.) Moreover, they refrain from
invoking information-theoretical arguments or exploiting
the system’s dynamics.
Without any knowledge of the system’s dynamics or
other clues as to the relevant observables, of course, it is
impossible to derive a Gibbs form from first principles.
Rather, in this situation the Gibbs form constitutes a
statistical hypothesis that can be supported or refuted
only by data. In Sec. IV, I gave a precise formulation of
the relevance hypothesis which is behind the use of the
Gibbs form. And in Sec. V, I outlined the statistical tools
FIG. 6. Optimizing the set of relevant observables. Black dots
represent tomographic images for various samples of the same
substance. The concentric circles around them symbolize the
associated likelihood functions, whose widths are an indicator
of the measurement uncertainties. These uncertainties vary
by sample and typically scale as 1/
√
Ni. The relevance hy-
pothesis, which is to be tested, claims that all data can be
modelled on a joint manifold of Gibbs states (grey line) with
reference state σ. If so, the Gibbs state closest to a tomo-
graphic image µ(i) is the state pi(i) (open dot). Both states
yield for the relevant observables the same expectation val-
ues {g(i)a }, i.e., they both belong to the set of states yielding
〈Ga〉 = g(i)a (black line).
needed to test this hypothesis in the light of experimental
data.
Taken together, the statistical methods discussed in
this paper comprise a toolbox which can be used to ascer-
tain (i) whether a hitherto unknown substance, of which
in particular the dynamics and the constants of the mo-
tion are not known, can be described by Gibbs states at
all; and if so, (ii) which observables are most likely the
relevant ones. The pertinent statistical analysis is based
entirely on the tomographic data gleaned from a collec-
tion of differently prepared, finite samples. It focuses on
the relative likelihoods rather than posterior probabilities
of rival hypotheses. The former are a good proxy for the
latter as long as there is no prior knowledge, and hence
no a priori bias in favor of any particular hypothesis.
Once the set of relevant observables, valid for the en-
tire collection of samples, has been established, there re-
mains the statistical task of estimating the values of the
pertinent Lagrange parameters for any given individual
sample. This is an interesting subject in itself, which has
been dealt with elsewhere [41, 42].
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